ABSTRACT
Purpose: This paper aims to examine options under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for exempting or justifying export restrictions or prohibitions that are in principle prohibited under Article XI:1 GATT. The paper begins by examining the exception under Article XI:2 (a) GATT, before going on to the arguments under GATT Article XX (b) and (j). In addition, the analysis considers the national security exception in Article XXI (b) (iii) GATT, given that WTO members have increasingly invoked this provision in recent years, as well as during the pandemic, when Namibia implemented COVID-19-related trade restrictions under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade based on national security concerns. Design/methodology/approach: The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade have been far-reaching. Countries have attempted to place export restrictions on personal protective equipment and COVID-19 vaccines. Even though export restrictions are generally unlawful under the GATT, countries have decided it is necessary at this time. Members have relied heavily on the "national security” and "critical shortage” exceptions outlined in the GATT. Findings: This paper concludes that, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, a pandemic may constitute an emergency in international relations, as defined in Article XXI (b) (iii) GATT, and that, in such a situation, a WTO member may legitimately take action to protect its vital security interests. Originality/value: The paper provides an original conclusion based on WTO case law on an issue of contemporary relevance. © 2023, Emerald Publishing Limited.
ABSTRACT
This Article contributes to the discussion about the development of international trade regulation of state interventionism by situating the tensions that exist about the future design of subsidies and state enterprises treaty regulation in the broader context of current systemic challenges to the multilateral trading system. While recent studies have explored the issues of subsidies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as one of the most significant in impact among the contemporary challenges to the WTO, there is certainly scope to discuss further such a problem from the broader point of view of the crisis of the multilateral trading system, its systemic challenges and the concomitant increasing politicization of international trade relations. To this end, this Article analyzes the interactions between the lasting decline of the WTO, growing political interferences with international trade flows and the prospects of reforming multilateral trade rules to address its systemic challenges and manage/mitigate newly central problems of the 21st century such as the Covid-19 Pandemic, climate change and the greening of economic production and international trade. The Article argues that existing WTO rules are not adequate to address these challenges and problems. It concludes that, like in the GATT era, it is only the spirit of pragmatism that may provide chances to find alternatives to growing frustration with negotiating inaction and, hence, to reform the system. However, the question remains whether it is possible to find an approach to imagine, remodel and craft multilateral rules that are sensitive to different economic, political, and social choices and able to rebalance the position of all members, large and small, rich and poor.
ABSTRACT
This paper applies an endogenous institutionalist framework to understand the evolution of the rules-based international trading system since the end of World War II. We argue that the initial success of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and re-enforcement that led to the formation of the WTO can be explained by three major factors: the hegemonic position of the US, the belief that international trade would foster prosperity and peace, and Cold War politics. However, declining US hegemony along with a shift in global comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing led to a shift from multilateral towards preferential trade agreements since the 1990s. Today, the WTO faces several new challenges, including increasing geo-political competition between the US and China, increasing digitization of commerce, and disrupted supply chains following COVID-19. A functioning WTO that facilitates global economic re-integration remains crucial to ensure a strong recovery from the pandemic and continued long-term prosperity and stability of the global economy. © 2023 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
ABSTRACT
This paper applies an endogenous institutionalist framework to understand the evolution of the rules‐based international trading system since the end of World War II. We argue that the initial success of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and re‐enforcement that led to the formation of the WTO can be explained by three major factors: the hegemonic position of the US, the belief that international trade would foster prosperity and peace, and Cold War politics. However, declining US hegemony along with a shift in global comparative advantage in labor‐intensive manufacturing led to a shift from multilateral towards preferential trade agreements since the 1990s. Today, the WTO faces several new challenges, including increasing geo‐political competition between the US and China, increasing digitization of commerce, and disrupted supply chains following COVID‐19. A functioning WTO that facilitates global economic re‐integration remains crucial to ensure a strong recovery from the pandemic and continued long‐term prosperity and stability of the global economy.
ABSTRACT
This article analyses the fraught relationship between host States’ obligations under investment agreements and their regulatory powers in the field of public health. First, tribunals addressing the merits of health measures have exercised considerable deference to States under existing treaties. Second, the recent generation of treaties spells out health considerations to encourage respondents or tribunals to adopt broad interpretations of the right to regulate, general exceptions, or article-specific carve-outs. Clauses modelled on GATT exceptions may prove difficult to invoke due to the ‘necessity’ threshold. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol may serve as a model of incentivising private investment in the public health sector.